The objective of this study was to assess the use of on-line monitoring to support the QMRA at water treatment plants studied in the EU MicroRisk project. SCADA data were obtained from three Catchment-to-Tap Systems (CTS) along with system descriptions, diary records, grab sample data and deviation reports. Particular attention was paid to estimating hazardous event frequency, duration and magnitude. Using Shewart and CUSUM we identified 'change-points' corresponding to events of between 10 min and . 1 month duration in timeseries data. Our analysis confirmed it is possible to quantify hazardous event durations from turbidity, chlorine residual and pH records and distinguish them from non-hazardous variability in the timeseries dataset. The durations of most 'events' were short-term (0.5-2.3 h). These data were combined with QMRA to estimate pathogen infection risk arising from such events as chlorination failure.
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of a drinking water supply is to provide safe drinking water for public consumption. The microbiological quality of drinking water is maintained by selecting good quality source water, application of water treatment plant processes and protection of the distribution system. Despite many advances, occasional outbreaks of waterborne diseases caused by pathogens still occur in developed as well as in developing countries (Ashbolt 2004; USEPA 2005) so new strategies are needed to understand and manage the hazardous events thought responsible. To this end a new risk-based approach, the Water Safety Plan, has been proposed by the World Health Organization (2005) for the provision of safe water (Fewtrell & Bartram 2001) . The Water Safety Plan is an iterative methodology where risk assessment and health targets promote risk management. Traditionally, assessment of microbial risks and identification of hazards and hazardous events has been undertaken through end point monitoring and epidemiologic health surveillance systems. These methods have generally resulted in drinking water of high quality but have, over the years, shown some shortcomings . To manage these shortcomings Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment (QMRA) has been proposed as the preferred way to assess potential waterborne risks in the receiving community (WHO 2004 Control Point (HACCP) concepts aimed at promoting better management of key barriers. These developments imply a need to better quantify the frequencies and magnitudes of barrier 'hazardous events', i.e. 'an incident or situation that can contribute to the presence of a hazard, where a hazard is a biological, chemical or physical agent that has the potential to cause harm and/or give rise to water quality which is unacceptable for consumers' (Nadebaum et al. 2004) .
Studying events is challenging as they often occur infrequently and unpredictably so that a low frequency grab sample style of routine monitoring has trouble detecting and characterising them. One approach which conceptually should allow the characterisation of such events is the analysis of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and similar data (e.g. river flow). SCADA data are collected in large quantities at high frequencies and are widely used for real-time online control and management of water treatment processes. At intervals as short as 1 s, SCADA systems collect flow, turbidity, pH, disinfectant residual and temperature measurements. But, despite the quantity of SCADA data available, only limited work appears to have been published on its post-collection analysis and use in risk assessment and management. LeChevallier & Au (2004) and WHO (2004) suggest better short-term monitoring and management schemes will improve health outcomes but there is little in either document on hazardous event characteristics. Haas et al. (1999) describe the statistical analysis of pathogen data in detail, but did not consider the analysis of surrogates or large timeseries. Lake et al. (2002) illustrate the use of particle size data for hazardous event management but do not report detailed statistical analysis of their own SCADA datasets. The exceptions are the work of Olofsson et al. (2001) and Westrell et al. (2003) . The latter study reports statistics on coagulant dosage and chlorination failures based on analysis of SCADA data and 300 incident reports, and included QMRA simulations which estimate the impact of potential hazardous events. Westrell et al. (2003) conclude that most infection risk arises under nominal treatment conditions. However, other workers (e.g. Corso
2003
; Smeets & Medema 2006) indicate that short-term failures can lead to disease outbreaks and be very costly.
Clearly more peer-reviewed investigations of 'hazardous events' are needed.
The objective of this study was to analyse SCADA datasets obtained through the EU MicroRisk project ) historical data survey and evaluate their potential use in QMRA and hence WSPs. Close attention was given to how 'hazardous events' might be recognised and quantified, and the use of timeseries analysis methods such as 'control charting' (Shewart 1931) and
Cumulative Sum Control Charting (CUSUM) analysis (Taylor 2000) . During the data analysis process a secondary issue considered was data reliability and quality. A preliminary assessment of its significance in SCADA data analysis was made from visual examination of SCADA traces, cross-comparisons of different SCADA records and comparison of SCADA with other plant records. statsoft.com/textbook/stquacon.html). In the Shewart method an event was provisionally identified by the occurrence of an outlier data group identified by comparison of the timeseries mode or similar statistic with 'control limit' boundaries (fixed value or statistically estimated from long term process records or special test runs). The CUSUM plotted S 1 to S n estimated by the equation
MATERIALS AND METHODS
where S is the sum of the sample measurements, n is the total number of data points, X n the data point and X the arithmetic mean of the data points (Taylor 2000) (Figure 2) .
A provisional event corresponded to a major trend change where a process slowly 'slid' out of control. These were then matched to CTS 6 diary records and deviation reports to see if they were likely to reflect an operational meter problem or some other non-hazardous change, such as cleaning. For each type of event we estimated the frequency, duration and magnitude of events at the monitoring points. Five types of SCADA event were identified (Table 1) .
SCADA data from CTS 1 and CTS 8 collected over 12-18 months between 2002-2004 were analysed to a more limited extent due to more limited secondary information being available for these systems. CTS 1 data was examined mainly for general patterns and internal consistency. SCADA data from CTS 8 was compared to concurrent water quality grab sample measurements of turbidity and total and residual Cl 2 .
In addition to turbidity, chlorine residual and pH, SCADA data from CTS 1 and 8 included ozone residual, and water supply and dosing flow rates.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Timeseries analysis
Data interpretation posed three initial challenges:
1. Managing and analysing SCADA datasets in a PC environment (e.g. CTS 1 data consisted of 13 million In the case of CTS 6 a total 119 possible 'events' were identified and classified. Seventy one percent of these were marked reduction of chlorine for several time steps, 76% were of unknown cause and 24% were caused by maintenance or incidents. The primary value of these statistics was that they provided estimates of the maximum frequency and duration of treatment failure that may impact on pathogen risks. Estimation of impact magnitude was more problematic but for conservative modelling purposes total process failure can be assumed to assess whether the worst case posed a problem, and hence the need for further work. For those events classified as possibly hazardous their duration, with few exceptions, ranged between 0.5 and 2.3 h.
Event characteristics based on SCADA data were then used in QMRA models to estimate the impacts of disinfection failure for historical or simulated hazardous events (for further information see Medema et al. (2006, ch 8) ).
Chlorination loss (Table 2 ) of 1.5 h at CTS 6 only marginally increased the annual infection risk for Campylobacter as with the events assessed by Westrell et al. (2003) . For CTS 8, however, simulated concurrent short-circuiting with the assessed frequency, duration and magnitude from SCADA data increased the annual risk 11-fold. Event duration estimates could also be compared to varying periods of simulated plant failure to determine the extent to which such risks were tolerable or otherwise (Figure 3) .
Such QMRA which used hazardous event characteristics derived from SCADA data highlighted how event impact need to be considered on a system-by-system and scenarioby-scenario basis.
Data reliability
Examination of data from CTS 1 and CTS 8 highlighted its quality as a major uncertainty for data interpretation (i.e. reliability, precision and accuracy). It had been assumed that the data as received would have been quality assured and appropriately edited and the meters from which the data was sourced well maintained. This did not appear to be always the case, e.g. comparison of chlorine data for CTS 8 showed poor correlation (r 2 ¼ 0.09) between spot measurements and SCADA data. And for CTS 1 inconsistencies were detected between related on-line measurements, e.g. when ozone dosing had been interrupted, as shown by pump flow, this was reflected in two residual ozone meters but a third remained fixed at the nominal dose of 2 mg L 21 . These (4) the magnitude of a risk posed by a SCADA event was not necessarily clear from the on-line measurements.
It had been hoped that using mainly SCADA data we could estimate frequencies, durations and magnitudes of hazardous events occurring for the MicroRisk CTSs for use in QMRA. In principle this appeared feasible, but the process of getting to a sufficient level was too time-consuming to be practical with available resources. Conceptually improvements might be achieved through automation of data analysis. But the necessary programming/data management systems do not appear available except in a basic form (incident/maintenance reports as text-processor and spreadsheet files versus hand-written records) which does not yet routinely recognise the on-line data quality assurance issue.
This study should be a seen as a first-time exploration of what is required to utilise SCADA information and what issues 'data-miners' should consider in planning their analyses. Clearly more research into the use of SCADA data is needed before exploitation for QMRA will be reliable.
Some questions which might be addressed include the following: 
